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NOTES 
CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTABILITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 
2009: PROTECTING YOUNG CONSUMERS OR 
IMPINGING ON THEIR FINANCIAL 
FREEDOM? 
INTRODUCTION 
There are an estimated 1.22 billion credit cards in the United States.1 
The average adult has about five credit cards.2 This increased use of credit 
has led to substantial debt and an increase in bankruptcy filings across the 
nation.3 College students are not immune to this trend.4 Although reports 
vary on the number of college students with credit cards, students are a well 
known market for credit card issuers.5 According to a 2001 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Report, almost “two-thirds of all college 
students had at least one credit card . . . .”6 In fact, of the nearly 9.9 million 
students currently enrolled at four-year colleges, each has an average of 2.8 
cards.7 Estimates of credit card debt upon graduation range from $2,2008 to 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. Press Release, Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group, Sen. Kohl et al., WISPIRG 
Advocate Student Credit Card Reform Proposals (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.wispirg.org/news-
releases/consumer-protection/consumer-protection-news/sen.-kohl-reps.-hintz-and-hixson-wispirg 
-advocate-student-credit-card-reform-proposals (citing CardTrack.com) [hereinafter WISPIRG]. 
 2. U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUC. FUND, THE CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP: 
A SURVEY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARD MARKETING 1 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/x-3Q-0RsKNbZtwOKzK1-dA/AZ-Campus-Credit-
Card-Trap-Report.pdf (citing THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 
(July 2007)) [hereinafter CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP]. 
 3. Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased Regulation of Credit Cards for 
College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 113–14 (2005). 
 4. In the time between initially writing this note and its subsequent publication, Regina L. 
Hinson published Credit Card Reform Goes to College in the North Carolina Banking Institute. 
Regina L. Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 287 
(2010). While both notes discuss flaws in the Act, the theses and approaches to the material differ 
in salient ways. Hinson addresses, among other things, the Act’s failure to regulate underage 
consumers’ spending habits (such as maximum credit limit and number of cards issued) and 
discusses how earlier versions of the Act would have required underage consumers to attend a 
financial literacy course prior to obtaining a credit card. Id. at 303–08. This note, rather, focuses 
on the general lack of protections for student data, discusses the impact on the rights of young 
consumers in depth, and suggests potential alternatives for dealing with the underlying issues 
facing young consumers. See infra Part III–IV. 
 5. Jekot, supra note 4, at 112–13. 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-773, CONSUMER FINANCE: COLLEGE 
STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 17 (June 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d01773.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 7. College Credit Card Statistics, U.C.M.S.COM, http://www.ucms.com/college-credit-card-
statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) (listing statistics on college marketing). 
 8. WISPIRG, supra note 1.  
160 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
$4,100.9 It is no wonder that credit solicitors aggressively target this market. 
As Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) stated, “[t]hey wallpaper all of those 
college hallways with credit cards because if you can get someone at that 
age to start using credit cards with your company, then you have got them 
for a long period of time.”10 In fact, more than 70% of students keep their 
first credit card.11 This provides a powerful incentive for the credit card 
industry. 
There have been several attempts by colleges and universities,12 state 
attorneys general,13 and state legislators to address this issue.14 However, 
only recently did Congress pass reform legislation that targets credit card 
marketing on college campuses and offers protections for students. The 
Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 
(Credit CARD Act or the Act)15 was intended as general credit reform 
legislation geared toward assisting those in debt and stopping abusive 
tactics of the credit card industry.16 The Act also specifically addresses 
young consumers. In Title III, the Act places a number of restrictions on 
extending credit to consumers under twenty-one, limits the ability of credit 
card issuers to solicit students, and adds protections for students from 
prescreened offers.17 The Act also places heavy disclosure requirements on 
institutions of higher education.18 
This note argues that Title III is a huge step toward protecting young 
consumers and reigning in the credit card industry. The Act puts an end to a 
number of coercive and deceptive practices of credit issuers19 while 
pressuring universities to be more open and forthcoming regarding their 
                                                                                                                                          
 9. Anne Flaherty, Credit Reform Means New Era for College Students, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 21, 2009, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/may/21/us-congress-
credit-cards-052109/?education; Joshua Heckathorn, Credit CARD Act of 2009 Restricts Credit 
for Students, BROKEGRADSTUDENT.COM (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.brokegradstudent.com/ 
credit-card-act-of-2009-restricts-credit-for-students. 
 10. Connie Prater & Tyler Metzger, A Guide to the Credit CARD Act of 2009, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (July 30, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-
law-interactive-1282.php (follow “Youth and credit” hyperlink; then follow “Under-21 college 
students” hyperlink) (quoting Senator Tom Carper). 
 11. College Credit Card Statistics, supra note 7. 
 12. Jonathan D. Glater, Extra Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B1. 
 13. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 10. 
 14. Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on 
College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 255 (2004). 
 15. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 16. See Ben Rooney, Credit Card Relief: Phase one: The First Part of Obama’s Crackdown 
on the Credit Card Industry Will Give Consumers More Notice When Contracts are Changed and 
the Option to Reject Rate Increases, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2009/08/19/news/economy/credit_card_reform/?postversion=2009082004. 
 17. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1637(c), (p), (r), 1650(f), 1681b(c)(1)(B) (West 2010). 
 18. Id. § 1650(f). 
 19. See id. §§ 1637(p), 1650(f). 
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participation in the problem.20 However, this note will assert that Title III 
also creates several legal and policy problems in how it restricts young 
consumers and how alternative solutions may have provided more efficient 
and impactful ways of addressing the underlying problems. 
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the marketing, soliciting, 
and lending practices of credit card companies on college campuses, the 
ramifications of student credit card debt, past attempts at reform, and the 
movement that led to the passing of the Credit CARD Act. Part II breaks 
down Title III of the Act and examines the rules and protections placed on 
young consumers and the institutions of higher education that they attend. 
Part III discusses the legal and policy ramifications of the Act, arguing that 
Title III severely curtails the financial autonomy of eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-olds, and falls short in protecting students from coercive marketing 
practices. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Act fails to solve the 
documented problems, and proposes alternative solutions that might better 
address the underlying issues. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF SOLICITING AND MARKETING 
PRACTICES BY CREDIT ISSUERS ON U.S. CAMPUSES 
Credit issuers flood college students with brochures, applications, 
advertisements, and freebies.21 As a result, 56% of students have their first 
card at age eighteen.22 By their final year, 91% have at least one credit card 
and 56% carry four or more cards.23 Credit issuers set up tables on 
campuses and outside school events in order to sell their products.24 This 
practice is so rampant that 76% of students have reported stopping at such 
tables to consider applying for credit cards.25 Most of the time students are 
enticed to stop at these tables by the offer of free gifts.26 The gifts are 
conditioned, however, on applications for cards.27 Once the cards are in the 
                                                                                                                                          
 20. See id. §§ 1637(r), 1650(f). 
 21. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
 22. Jessica Dickler, Credit Card Debt on Campus: Unprepared Students Have Been 
Increasingly Targeted by Card Issuers, and Some Lawmakers are Taking Notice, 
CNNMONEY.COM, July 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/10/pf/credit_cards_college/? 
postversion=2008071413 (citing data from Nellie Mae). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Lucy Lazarony, Marketing Plastic to Students Causes Lawmakers, Educators to Melt 
Down, BANKRATE.COM (June 21, 1999), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/19990621.asp. 
 25. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 3. 
 26. Id. at 3–4. 
 27. Id. Of the 76% of students who stop, 31% report being offered a free gift. Most common 
gifts are t-shirts (50%), other (40%), frisbee or sports toy (20%), and mug or water bottle (18%). 
The “other” was most commonly food. Id.; see also Amy Johannas, College Bound: Marketers 
Welcome, But Credit Card Companies Get a Warning Signal, PROMO (Aug. 1, 2008, 12:00 PM), 
http://promomagazine.com/eventmarketing/0801-companies-college-campaigns. 
‘There is just this kind of crazy marketing atmosphere on campuses,’ [says Christine 
Lindstrom, the higher education program director for U.S. PIRG]. ‘It’s pretty easy 
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hands of the students, the issuers continually increase interest rates and 
employ high penalties, exacerbating the consequences of the original 
misguided judgment.28 
The scene that awaits students is not a product of chance, nor is it solely 
due to credit issuers’ initiative. Indeed, universities have a stake in these 
exchanges and actively facilitate the marketers’ access to their students.29 
Universities have multimillion-dollar deals with credit card companies.30 
For example, “Michigan State [University] had a seven-year, $8.4 million 
contract with Bank of America during which MSU gave the bank 
information on students, alumni, sports ticket holders and employees.”31 In 
addition, many universities have affinity card agreements that allow the 
credit issuer to use the university’s name to market its cards.32 In exchange, 
the university receives a share of the profits from new accounts.33 This 
incentivizes the university to entice and indebt students with credit cards.34 
Some, however, see the agreements between universities and credit card 
issuers as a win-win situation.35 Banks get ideal marketing opportunities, 
students get help paying the bills, and universities get an additional revenue 
source.36 
                                                                                                                                          
when facing [a gift of] free pizza for a student to say, ‘Oh, I’ll just go ahead and get the 
card.’ That is a big problem.’ 
Id. 
 28. See WISPIRG, supra note 1. 
 29. Glater, supra note 12. 
 30. Flaherty, supra note 9. Bank of America is one of the biggest credit card issuers on college 
campuses. Glater, supra note 12. As of January 2009, the bank has agreements with about 700 
colleges and alumni associations. Id. 
 31. Susan Tompor, Credit Cards to be Curbed at Colleges, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 27, 
2009, http://www.freep.com/article/20090827/COL07/908270447/Credit-cards-to-be-curbed-at-
colleges. Michigan State University even stands to receive additional money if the students who 
sign up carry a balance. Glater, supra note 12. According to the New York Times, Michigan State 
University gets “$3 for every card whose holder pays an annual fee, and a payment of a half 
percent of the amount of all retail purchases using the cards,” and “$3 if the holder has a balance 
at the end of the 12th month after opening an account.” Id. Additionally, the “alumni association 
of the University of Michigan is guaranteed $25.5 million” in exchange for “lists of names and 
addresses of students, faculty, alumni and holders of season tickets to athletic events” over an 11 
year agreement with Bank of America. Id. 
 32. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. 
 33. E.g., Tompor, supra note 31. The profit from these contacts with credit issuers is so 
important to many universities that they have fought legislative reform. See, e.g., Joseph Kenny, 
College Fights to Preserve Student Credit Card Marketing, JSNET.ORG (Apr. 10, 2009), 
http://www.jsnet.org/news-article/college-fights-to-preserve-student-credit-card-marketing 
(describing Ohio State University’s fight against legislation that would limit their agreements with 
credit issuers). 
 34. See Ben Protess & Jeannette Neumann, As Student Credit Card Debt Rises, Banks Quietly 
Reward Schools, HUFFINGTON POST INVESTIGATIVE FUND (June 8, 2010, 8:01 AM), 
http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/06/student-credit-card-debt-rises-banks-quietly-reward-
schools. 
 35. See Glater, supra note 12. 
 36. Id. 
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There are several reasons why the university campus is an ideal 
marketing setting for banks and credit card companies. First, most students 
are first time credit card users, making them a fresh market.37 Second, they 
constitute an isolated and easily identifiable market.38 Most college students 
live on or commute to a campus.39 Third, because they are relatively new 
consumers, they are more likely to be naïve to the practices of the credit 
card industry.40 Most students realize that they must build their credit 
because it will be a useful tool for future purchases.41 At the same time, 
they may not be educated in the nuances of how credit works.42 For 
example, a student may realize that he must pay the credit card company 
every month but may not understand what an annual percentage rate (APR) 
is or how it will affect his balance.43 Credit card issuers rely on this naiveté 
when they raise interest rates to increase their profits. Lastly, many 
students, like other consumers, keep and continue to use their first credit 
card.44 These factors lead to heavy soliciting of, and marketing to, college 
students on or near campuses.45 
This heavy marketing is demonstrated by the twenty-five to fifty credit 
card solicitations students receive per semester.46 The solicitations take 
various forms, including tabling at school events, direct mail solicitations, 
and brochures in a variety of campus locations.47 A study conducted by the 
U.S. Public Interest Research Group reported that 80% of respondent 
students had received mail solicitations from credit card issuers and 22% 
“reported receiving an average of nearly four (3.6) [solicitation] phone calls 
per month . . . .”48 
In a 2005 report, Ohio State University’s Creola Johnson described the 
scene set by credit card companies that awaits incoming freshmen as “a 
‘carnival atmosphere’ of blaring music and free food . . . with glossy 
promotional brochures and loaded with free T-shirts, Frisbees and other 
                                                                                                                                          
 37. Dickler, supra note 22. 
 38. See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical Implications of 
Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 414–16, 422–24 (2001). 
 41. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 1. 
 42. Lucas, supra note 40, at 414–16. 
 43. See generally Basic Facts About Credit Card Rates: Key Information Every Cardholder 
Should Know, BANK OF AMERICA, http://learn.bankofamerica.com/articles/managing-credit/ 
basic-facts-about-credit-card-rates.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) (describing the complexities 
in applying APR rates to credit card balances). 
 44. See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 7 (detailing how credit card companies 
compete for college students to become their “first-in-the-wallet, top-of-the-wallet” card). 
 45. See id. at 2–4. 
 46. College Credit Card Statistics, supra note 7. 
 47. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
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gifts to lure students into applying for credit cards.”49 Johnson goes on to 
explain that, “[c]ompany representatives do not talk about the interest rates 
or fees associated with the cards. Presumably, that information is contained 
in the brochures. Instead, the credit card vendors emphasize the free items 
and an easy way to buy clothes and books or pay for spring break 
vacations.”50 
These practices have contributed to a documented increase in student 
credit card debt and financial management problems.51 Many critics also 
cite excessive credit lines for those who do not necessarily qualify as an 
additional source of the problem.52 Although introductory credit limits may 
be low, they can quickly rise to $2,000 or $4,000.53 
In response, some universities are starting to rethink their policies and 
agreements with credit issuers.54 In recent years, there has been a big push 
from students and public advocates who oppose such aggressive marketing 
techniques on college campuses.55 Some universities have banned or greatly 
restricted the practice of soliciting on campus altogether56 while others have 
limited its scope and frequency.57 
Along with the push for change from within the university, some state 
legislators are stepping in and trying to set limits on these practices. 
However, while statistics vary on the number of states with legislation 
specifically restricting marketing on campus, the number remains generally 
low.58 Texas, California, New York, and Oklahoma are among the few 
                                                                                                                                          
 49. Martin Merzer, Student Credit Card Issuers Losing Their Welcome on Campus: 
Relationship Between Banks, Colleges is Complex, CREDITCARDS.COM (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/student-credit-card-issuers-losing-welcome-on-
campus-1279.php. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See SALLIE MAE, HOW UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS USE CREDIT CARDS: SALLIE MAE’S 
NATIONAL STUDY OF USAGE RATES AND TRENDS 2009, at 3 (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/0BD600F1-9377-46EA-AB1F-6061FC763246/10744/ 
SLMCreditCardUsageStudy41309FINAL2.pdf [hereinafter SALLIE MAE STUDY]; see also Jekot, 
supra note 3, at 113–14; Johnson, supra note 14, at 206–19. 
 52. See, e.g., Tompor, supra note 31 (citing as an example a student who was given $25,000 
even though he did not have a full-time job). 
 53. Jeanne Sahadi, Dad, Will You Pay My Visa?; That’s One Question Facing Parents of 
College Students Who’ve Racked Up Credit Card Debt, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 12, 2002, 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/10/commentary/everyday/sahadi (citing Robert Manning during 
his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs). 
 54. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25–29. 
 55. See generally id. at 27–29. 
 56. Id. at 25–27. 
 57. Id.; Johnson, supra note 14, at 195–96. For example, Ball State University, whose alumni 
association had a contract with a credit issuer, does not give out student information to marketers. 
Glater, supra note 12. Likewise, University of Oregon has a similar policy. Id. 
 58. Editorial, The College Credit Card Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A22 (“A half-
dozen states have placed restrictions on how credit cards can be marketed at public colleges.”); 
Jon Chavez, Card Firms Lure Students; Experts Urge Crackdown, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 14, 
2007, http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071014/BUSINESS04/71013025 
(“About 15 states restrict or ban credit-card marketing to students on campus . . . .”); see also 
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states that have passed such laws.59 For example, the California law, passed 
in 2007, prohibits the exchange of gifts for applications.60 The New York 
statute (part of New York’s Education Law) is much broader.61 It prohibits 
marketing altogether, except as allowed by university policy.62 The law also 
makes suggestions for fair policies that schools could adopt.63 
In addition to these state legislative reforms, several attorneys general 
have tried to initiate reform in credit marketing to college students. Several 
have opened investigations into the practices of credit card issuers on 
campuses.64 For example, in 2008, former New York Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo investigated whether credit card marketers had offered 
money to universities in exchange for access and information on students.65 
Likewise, the Ohio Attorney General sued Citibank, a credit card marketing 
company, and a sandwich shop over their alleged deceptive marketing to 
college students.66 
On the federal level, there have been a number of congressional 
attempts to add protections for college students wishing to obtain credit.67 
For example, the Consumer Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999 
(CCCPA) was introduced in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 
                                                                                                                                          
Tyler Metzger, Campus Credit Card Regulation Brewing . . . Again, CREDITCARDS.COM (Feb. 3, 
2009), http://blogs.creditcards.com/2009/02/campus-credit-card-regulation-brewing.php (detailing 
proposed New Jersey bill). 
 59. Merzer, supra note 49. Maryland also passed legislation which “requires higher education 
institutions to develop practices regarding credit card marketing and the use of free gifts on 
campus.” Johannas, supra note 27. If the universities allow these practices, they must also provide 
additional educational credit information. Id. Another example is Tennessee, where state 
legislators passed a law that prohibits credit issuers from using student organizations or facilities 
in order to recruit applicants. Id. They are, however, allowed to do so at athletic events, but are 
banned from giving gifts in exchange for applications. Id. 
 60. College Student Credit Protection Act of 2007, Ch. 679, 2007 Cal. Stat. 262; Ashley 
Geren, Credit Card Death: Students Might Want to Think Twice Before Getting a Credit Card, 
THEROUNDUPNEWS.COM (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.therounduponline.net/features/credit-card-
death-1.1878895. 
 61. See N.Y. EDUC. § 6437 (McKinney 2010). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 10. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. The Ohio Attorney General sued Citibank, Elite Marketing, and Potbelly Sandwiches 
for “‘unfair and deceptive’ marketing practices.” Johannas, supra note 27. The Attorney General 
alleged that “students visited local restaurants for free food, only to find out they had to apply for 
a credit card to receive it.” Id. The case has been partially settled. Id. As part of the settlement, 
Potbelly agreed to give out coupons for its products as an incentive to get students to watch a 
documentary on the credit industry. Id. 
 67. See Student Credit Card Protection Act of 2007, S. 1925, 110th Cong. (2007); College 
Student Credit Card Protection Act, H.R. 1208, 109th Cong. (2005); Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2004, S. 2755, 108th Cong. (2004); College Student Credit 
Card Protection Act, H.R. 184, 107th Cong. (2001); Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999, 
S. 787, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999, H.R. 900, 
106th Cong. (1999). 
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in April and May of 1999, respectively.68 Like the Credit CARD Act of 
2009, the CCCPA contained a provision mandating a consumer under 
twenty-one have a parent or guardian co-signer or to have an independent 
means of repaying their credit card debt.69 
Despite several attempts in both the House and Senate, including the 
CCCPA, credit reform for college students had not passed into law.70 
However, things in Washington changed with the 2008 election.71 President 
Obama made consumer protection a part of his campaign.72 Amid a climate 
of foreclosures and high debt, Obama pushed for reform in several 
industries, including the credit card sector.73 In the White House press 
release announcing the Credit CARD Act, President Obama tied the new 
law into his larger economic recovery plans.74 With the turbulent changes in 
the economy, the shift in Washington, and new support for major credit 
reform, the Credit CARD Act survived the legislative process and passed 
into law.75 
II. PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY THE CREDIT CARD ACT 
In January 2009, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY) 
introduced H.R. 627, which would later form the basis for the Credit CARD 
Act.76 H.R. 627 was intended to amend the Truth in Lending Act77 and the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCA)78 in order to “establish fair and 
transparent practices relating to the extension of credit under an open end 
                                                                                                                                          
 68. Todd Starr Palmer, Mary Beth Pinto & Diane H. Parente, College Students’ Credit Card 
Debt and the Role of Parental Involvement: Implications for Public Policy, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 105, 106 (Spring 2001). 
 69. H. R. 900 § 7; S. 787 § 7; 15 U.S.C.A. 1637(c) (West 2010). 
 70. Kimberly Gartner & Elizabeth Schiltz, What’s Your Score? Educating College Students 
About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 408–09 (2005); see also Johnson, 
supra note 14, at 254–56. 
 71. See Philip Elliott, Obama Signs Law Curbing Surprise Credit Card Fees, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/22/obama-signs-law-
curbing-s_n_206944.html. 
 72. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Reforms to Protect American Credit Card 
Holders (May 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reforms-to-
Protect-American-Credit-Card-Holders [hereinafter White House Press Release]. 
 73. See Elliott, supra note 71. 
 74. See White House Press Release, supra note 72 (“‘With this new law, consumers will have 
the strong and reliable protections they deserve. We will continue to press for reform that is built 
on transparency, accountability, and mutual responsibility—values fundamental to the new 
foundation we seek to build for our economy.’”). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009-2010): H.R. 627: All Congressional 
Actions with Amendments, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d111:HR00627:@@@S (listing Rep. Maloney as the sponsor of the bill H.R. 627 that 
ultimately became the Credit CARD Act). 
 77. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006). 
 78. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
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consumer credit plan, and for other purposes.”79 It became public law on 
May 22, 2009 when President Obama, in a Rose Garden ceremony, signed 
the bill.80 The Act covers general consumer protection, enhanced consumer 
disclosures, protection of young consumers, gift cards, and other 
miscellaneous items.81 
Title III of the Act is devoted exclusively to protecting young 
consumers and is broken down into five sections. The first section of Title 
III amends the Truth in Lending Act by limiting the “extension of credit to 
underage consumers.”82 Section 301 prohibits the issuance of a credit card 
or open end credit plan to a consumer under the age twenty-one83 unless the 
application for that consumer contains a signature of a co-signer84 or 
financial information indicating means of repayment.85 According to the 
Act, the co-signer can be a “parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other 
individual” twenty-one-years-of-age or older.86 The co-signer must have the 
“means to repay the debts” of the consumer and will be considered jointly 
liable for that debt.87 However, the co-signer is only liable for the debt 
incurred before the consumer has reached the age of twenty-one.88 
Alternatively, absent a viable co-signer, a credit card applicant under the 
age of twenty-one may demonstrate an “independent means of repaying any 
obligation arising from the proposed extension of credit . . . .”89 The text 
does not give much explanation as to what “means” would qualify under 
this provision. It only requires that the consumer submit such financial 
information through the application or otherwise.90 
Section 301(C) tasks the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (the Board) with issuing regulations outlining the standards required 
to satisfy subparagraph (B)(ii).91 The Board usually issues clarifications on 
                                                                                                                                          
 79. Credit CARD Act of 2009, H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 80. Elliott, supra note 71. 
 81. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). 
 82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c) (West 2010) (implying that the use of the word “underage” applies 
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 83. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(A). 
 84. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i). 
 85. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii). 
 86. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(C). The regulations, over 800 pages, detail what credit card issuers must 
do to grant or extend credit to all consumers covered under the Act. Connie Prater, Fed: Want a 
Credit Card? Prove You Can Pay the Bill, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-act-fed-income-rules-1282.php. The 
regulations also clarify several vague terms in the provisions dealing with young consumers, 
including “prohibited inducements,” “near campus,” “independent means of paying,” and co-
signer requirements. Jay MacDonald, Fed: Credit Card Issuers, Stay Far Away From College 
Campus: Stay At Least 1,000 Feet Away, New Regulations State, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 30, 
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the terms of a newly issued law,92 and it did so on September 28, 2009, 
providing examples of the type of information that would qualify as proof 
of an independent means of repaying.93 This included “expected salary, 
wages, bonus pay, tips and commissions” for any type of employment, 
“interest or dividends, retirement benefits, public assistance, alimony, child 
support, or separate maintenance payments,” or “savings accounts or 
investments that the consumer can or will be able to use.”94 These 
provisions likely limit the number of college students under age twenty-one 
who could qualify.95 It is unclear, however, how strictly credit issuers must 
adhere to this “proof” standard.96 
The Act further provides that even once a student has been issued a 
credit card, the co-signer, if jointly liable for a consumer under twenty-one, 
must approve any increase to the credit line for that consumer.97 By 
amending § 127 of the Truth in Lending Act,98 § 303 of the Credit CARD 
Act restricts young consumers beyond the application process.99 It places an 
additional hurdle for eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds to obtain and 
manage their credit by requiring that the co-signer approve the credit 
increase. 
To stem the flow of solicitations on college campuses, Congress 
included protections from prescreened offers as well as restrictions on the 
distribution of promotional items. Title III, § 302 amends § 604(c)(1)(B) of 
the FRCA100 to include restrictions on prescreened credit offers to 
consumers under twenty-one.101 This section provides that credit reporting 
agencies can furnish credit reports for offers of credit only if the consumer 
is over twenty-one or has consented to the disclosure.102 In other words, 
except for eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds who have consented to the 
                                                                                                                                          
2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/student-credit-card-rules-1279.php. This is 
discussed infra Part III. 
 92. MacDonald, supra note 91. 
 93. Truth in Lending Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,125, 54,313 (Oct. 21, 2009) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally Prater, supra note 91. See also Brian Burnsed, New Rules Place Barriers 
Between Students, Credit Card Issuers, US NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19, 2010, 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-colleges/2010/02/19/new-rules-place-barriers-
between-students-credit-card-issuers.html. 
 96. See generally MacDonald, supra note 91 (explaining the Federal Reserve’s clarifications 
but noting the failure to clarify certain aspects of the Act); see also Prater, supra note 91 (failing 
to specify what reasonable policy or procedure might entail). 
 97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(p) (West 2010). 
 98. Truth in Lending Act § 127, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2006). 
 99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(p). 
 100. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 101. 15 U.S.C.A § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(2)(iv) (West 2010). 
 102. Id. 
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disclosure of their credit report for offers of credit, the automatic flood of 
mailings that bombard college freshman should theoretically start to ebb.103 
The Act also adds protection from solicitations by proscribing physical 
inducements in exchange for applications.104 Section 304(f)(2) prohibits 
creditors from offering “tangible item[s]” to college students in exchange 
for a credit card application.105 However, this prohibition is limited to offers 
made on or near campus or at a school-sponsored event.106 In its 
clarifications of the Act, the Board gave examples of what types of 
inducements would be prohibited.107 The Act proscribes the use of tangible 
items, such as a “gift card, a T-shirt, or magazine subscription” in exchange 
for filled applications, but does not prohibit “non-physical items” like 
“discounts, reward points, or promotional credit terms.”108 Not only is the 
type of item an important distinguishing factor in determining the legality 
of a practice, but the agreement must indeed be a quid pro quo.109 If the 
items are given out freely regardless of whether applications are in fact 
being filled out, then it would seem the Act does not apply.110 
The Board’s regulations also specify that “near campus” is defined as 
“within 1,000 feet of the border of the campus of an institution of higher 
education . . . .”111 The borders should be determined by the institution.112 
The prohibition against promotions near campus also extends to related 
events, including any event in which the institution’s name or logo is used 
in connection with the event so as to imply the institution’s sponsorship.113 
In this way, § 304 potentially covers an expansive area on or near campus. 
Besides the limitations specifically outlined in § 304, Congress also 
recommends that institutions of higher education adopt their own policies to 
help monitor and limit credit card marketing.114 It recommends that these 
institutions instruct credit issuers to notify them of the locations where 
marketing of credit cards will occur.115 Section 304 also recommends that 
schools limit the number of locations for marketing116 and offer debt 
counseling and education to new students.117 
                                                                                                                                          
 103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B); see also Heckathorn, supra note 9. 
 104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f)(2) (West 2010). 
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 107. MacDonald, supra note 91. 
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 109. See id. at 54,328. 
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 112. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. at 54,328; MacDonald, supra note 91. 
 113. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. at 54,328; MacDonald, supra note 91. 
 114. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f)(3) (West 2010). 
 115. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(A). 
 116. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(B). 
 117. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(C). 
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The final protection Title III provides is required disclosure of the 
contracts between universities and creditors.118 Institutions of higher 
education must “publicly disclose any contract or other agreement made 
with a card issuer or creditor for the purpose of marketing a credit card.”119 
Likewise, the Act mandates reporting by each creditor who has any 
“business, marketing, and promotional agreements and college affinity 
card120 agreements with an institution of higher education.”121 The report 
must include the terms and conditions of any agreements between creditors 
and universities, including memoranda of understanding, amounts of 
payments between them, and the number of accounts covered by the 
agreement.122 Once creditors have submitted the reports to the Board, the 
Board will review them and submit an annual report to Congress and the 
public.123 Additionally, from time to time the Comptroller General of the 
United States is to review the Board’s reports, determine the impact of 
creditor agreements, and write a report recommending any needed action.124 
The passage of Title III is a tacit recognition of the need to protect 
young consumers against the aggressive and deceptive practices of credit 
issuers. The Act finally puts an end to the exchange of gifts for 
applications.125 Prohibiting tangible inducements will limit the ability of 
marketers to get the attention of college students.126 In turn, only those truly 
interested in obtaining a credit card will likely approach a promotional 
table. Furthermore, the Act protects students from insidious pre-screened 
offers with which they are consistently bombarded.127  
                                                                                                                                          
 118. Id. §§ 1650(f)(1), 1637(r)(2)(A). 
 119. Id. § 1650(f)(1). 
 120. The Act defines college affinity card as a:  
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Id. § 1637(r)(1)(A). 
 121. Id. § 1637(r)(2)(A). 
 122. Id. § 1637(r)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 123. Id. § 1637(r)(3). 
 124. Id. § 1637(r)(3)(B)(1)–(2). 
 125. Id. § 1650(f)(2). 
 126. See generally CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 13 (proposing “prohibit[ing] 
use of gifts in marketing on campus” as part of “fair campus credit card marketing principles”). 
 127. 15 U.S.C.A. 1681b(c)(1)(B) (West 2010). 
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Finally, forcing the universities to disclose their contracts with credit 
issuers will provide a new level of transparency and accountability. Most 
students are unaware of the benefits the university is gaining through credit 
marketing on campus.128 With every application and subsequent account, 
the university usually makes a profit.129 These deals may stipulate when and 
how marketing can be done, provide unlimited access to student registration 
data, or even allow for use of the university name in connection with the 
credit cards.130 Exposing the agreements will not only increase public 
awareness about these practices but may also deter the more unconscionable 
aspects of these agreements.131 
Although the Act has the potential to provide significant protection for 
young consumers, it also implicates several legal and policy issues. The Act 
discriminates on the basis of age by imposing additional requirements on 
consumers under twenty-one132 and disproportionately impacts specific 
segments of the young adult population.133 The Act also does not go far 
enough in protecting students from solicitations on campus134 and fails to 
solve the underlying problems that originally created the need for reform.135 
III. LEGAL AND POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ACT 
A. RIGHTS OF YOUNG CONSUMERS 
Title III of the Act creates different contractual standards for consumers 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.136 Placing additional 
restrictions on this specific age group is both discriminatory and 
ineffective.137 In addition, the all-inclusive restrictions freeze out many 
young consumers who would benefit from a credit card and are capable of 
handling credit responsibly but who cannot meet the heightened 
standards.138 Lastly, the restrictions disproportionately affect lower income 
students as well as eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old non-students.139  
                                                                                                                                          
 128. See Glater, supra note 12. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, Credit Reforms Reach Campuses, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 2010, at 
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 135. See infra Part IV. 
 136. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1637(c)(8), 1637(p) (West 2010). 
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Young consumers are a vital and important part of the economic 
marketplace.140 They often lead the way in consumer trends and shape 
certain markets.141 Although most people enter the marketplace at a young 
age under the purchases of their parents, once they reach the age of 
majority—eighteen in most states142—they can be considered financially 
independent consumers.143 At the age of majority, consumers gain the right 
to enter into binding economic contracts, along with the right to vote and 
join the military without parental consent.144 Parents’ legal duty of support 
ends when offspring reach this age, as does parental authority.145 Although 
many parents may continue to support their children, they are not legally 
required to do so.146 
Although a child under eighteen may enter into a contract, the child 
retains the right to disaffirm any contract before she reaches the age of 
majority.147 The right of disaffirmance is meant to protect children from 
careless financial decisions and reduce the incentive for adults to enter into 
contracts with children.148 At the age of majority, however, young adults 
lose this right and are bound by their contractual obligations.149 Because 
they are responsible for their contractual agreements, young adults at the 
age of majority should therefore be given full control over their contractual 
decisions.150 
Despite the full responsibility young adults assume for their contractual 
obligations, Title III of the Act places limitations on their ability to enter 
into contractual agreements with credit card companies.151 These limits are 
                                                                                                                                          
 140. “Teenagers spend billions of dollars annually on clothing, video games, CD players, 
stereos, and cars.” ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND THE 
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2009) (citation omitted). 
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199–200 (1998). 
 143. See generally id. 
 144. See generally ARNEST, supra note 142, at 84–85, 199; 10 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). A few 
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 148. See, e.g., McGuckian v. Carpenter, 110 A. 402 (R.I. 1920); see also ARNEST, supra note 
142, at 84–85. 
 149. ARNEST, supra note 142, at 84–85. 
 150. See generally Ashley Goetz, Editorial, Credit Card Act Treats Adults as Children, MINN. 
DAILY, June 9, 2009, http://www.mndaily.com/2009/06/09/credit-card-act-treats-adults-children 
(“Congress is saying that college-aged people aren’t really adults yet.”). 
 151. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c)(8)(B) (West 2010). 
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stricter than those placed on adults over the age of twenty-one.152 Section 
301(B) requires an eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old applicant without a co-
signer to indicate through financial information that he or she has the ability 
to repay any obligation under the account.153 In contrast, § 109 of Title I of 
the Act, which applies to consumers over twenty-one, states that in order to 
open an open-end consumer credit plan, the card issuer must consider “the 
ability of the consumer to make the required payments under the terms of 
such account.”154 Section 109 provides a much easier standard to qualify for 
a credit card than § 304. First, it only applies to open-end consumer credit 
plans, rather than any credit card application.155 Second, the issuer must 
only consider the consumer’s ability to make required payments, as 
compared to requiring an ability to repay any obligation.156 In other words, 
under § 109, the card issuer must consider only whether the consumer over 
twenty-one is able to make minimum monthly payments, while § 304 
requires that the consumer under twenty-one be able to repay any debt 
incurred. The tougher standards for consumers eighteen- to twenty-one 
years old discriminate against this group solely on the basis of their age.157 
Despite the fact that eighteen-year-olds are considered adults and bound by 
their contractual obligations, the Act treats them as a separate and distinct 
group—different from children but not yet having full financial rights. 
The arguably arbitrary restrictions on eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds 
also freeze out many young adult consumers who want and would benefit 
from credit. In an attempt to protect young consumers, Congress has 
“limited the ability of their more responsible peers to build up credit 
histories they’ll need when they graduate.”158 It is wise for many young 
consumers to build such histories. Credit reports are being used more and 
more for a variety of purposes including renting apartments, loan rates, job 
                                                                                                                                          
 152. Compare id. § 1665e (describing the requirements necessary for individuals over twenty-
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hiring, and insurance.159 However, many students who need and are capable 
of handling credit would not qualify under the new rules. First, because the 
co-signer will incur any of the obligations and suffer any damages that 
result from the student’s use of the card, few students are likely to obtain a 
potential co-signer other than a parent.160 Second, without co-signers, it may 
be difficult for young consumers who actually need and will use credit 
cards responsibly to provide enough documentation to demonstrate that 
they are financially stable, even to issuers who require the bare minimum.161 
“Many—especially college students and lower-income young adults—don’t 
have easy access to a financially stable co-signer, [or] a full bank account . . 
. .”162 
Not only will these restrictions limit students’ ability to build credit 
histories, but it will also hamper their ability to finance important 
purchases, like books or health insurance.163 Many students are no longer 
financially supported by their parents.164 They may be unable to pay for 
expensive textbooks all at once, and would rather finance the purchase and 
make payments over a few months.165 By restricting their ability to get 
credit, the Act is especially harmful to responsible students working to put 
themselves through school.166 
In the same way the Act hurts responsible young adults wishing to build 
their credit, it also has a disproportionate effect on lower income students. 
These students may have little or no financial support from their parents.167 
Likewise, they or their parents may not be able to provide proof of their 
ability to repay.168 So while these lower income students may be able to 
make minimum monthly payments and repay their obligation over time, 
they may not be able to prove that to a credit issuer. 
Another group adversely affected by the Act is non-students. Although 
many sections of Title III are aimed at protecting students from aggressive 
solicitations, it also has a significant impact on young non-student 
consumers.169 Many young adults do not continue on to college after high 
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school graduation, often opting to work or go to a vocational training 
program.170 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, 
compared with the sixty-three million students in elementary and secondary 
school, only twenty-one million are in post-secondary degree granting 
institutions.171 These eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old young adults are 
especially vulnerable to the new restrictions. Often independent from their 
parents and building a life of their own, they may need to make significant 
purchases such as a car, furniture, insurance, or even a house.172 Obtaining 
credit in order to finance such purchases and build a credit history is vital in 
establishing financial independence.173 By placing heavier restrictions on 
acquiring credit, the Act hampers the ability of these eighteen- to twenty-
one-year-olds to become fully independent adult consumers despite the fact 
that they function as such in every other aspect.174 
Although the Act frames the issue as one of protectionism, its 
restrictions on the financial freedom of young adults is saturated with 
paternalism. At a certain point, society must stop placing restrictions on the 
autonomy of young adults.175 Usually this point comes at the age of 
majority when children are considered legal adults, independent from their 
parents and subject to the same rights and responsibilities as other adults.176 
By restricting the ability of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds to get a credit 
card like any other adult, the Act merely delays full financial freedom and 
tramples on the autonomy of young consumers. 
The Act also only delays and does not solve the youthful misjudgments 
its proponents were originally concerned about. In passing the Act, many 
legislators and advocates justified the provisions with the idea that young 
consumers were getting buried in debt because they did not know how to 
manage and build responsible credit.177 Those young adults who now 
cannot get a credit card under Title III will be no better equipped with the 
skills and knowledge necessary to manage credit upon their twenty-first 
birthday.178 By failing to mandate credit education or provide any additional 
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resources to teach young consumers these skills, Title III does not get to the 
heart of the underlying problem.179 On the contrary, the financial 
independence of young consumers is merely delayed, specific groups are 
disproportionately impacted, and the autonomy of young adults is hampered 
without adequately addressing the issues that form the basis of the problem. 
B. NOT FAR ENOUGH: CONTRACT AGREEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS 
ON MARKETING 
While the Act’s limitations on marketing and its requirements of 
university contract disclosures contribute to solving the problem of 
predatory solicitation on college campuses, these limitations do not go far 
enough. Contract disclosures will not prevent universities from providing 
student data to credit card issuers.180 At the same time, the disclosures may 
violate confidentiality provisions and impinge on contractual privacy.181 In 
addition, Title III’s limits on marketing merely prevent the distribution of 
pre-screened offers and tangible gifts,182 leaving large loopholes for 
solicitors to continue to take advantage of students on campus. 
Forcing universities to disclose their contracts with credit issuers183 may 
have some beneficial effects. For one, it may deter universities from using 
blatantly unconscionable contract provisions.184 However, it will not likely 
deter universities from freely giving out student data in exchange for a 
portion of the profits issuers realize from student credit accounts.185 The 
sharing of student information provides creditors with the ability to target 
the student market and provides the essential means for the tactics the Act is 
trying to stop.186 By failing to limit student data disclosure, the Act does not 
go far enough in addressing contractual agreements between universities 
and credit card issuers. 
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The Act also insufficiently limits marketing on campus. Although it 
prohibits giving out tangible items in exchange for credit card application, 
the Act does not prohibit issuers from providing these gifts for free.187 
Under Title III, credit card marketers are still able to give out free items to 
entice students to come over to a table and speak with representatives. The 
items simply cannot be conditioned on a filled out application.188 In other 
words, before the Act the marketers had tables giving out free pizza in 
exchange for a filled out application, and now the marketers can still have 
tables with pizza and applications but just no quid pro quo exchange.189 
There is no doubt that students will still be enticed by the smell of free 
pizza and fall into the same traps laid by the solicitors.190 While the 
elimination of the quid pro quo exchange is an important and crucial step in 
reforming credit card marketing practices on college campuses, it is not 
enough. 
IV. THE ACT’S FLAWS PREVENT IT FROM ADDRESSING SOME 
OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES FACING YOUNG 
CONSUMERS WHILE OTHER ALTERNATIVES MAY 
PROVIDE MORE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTIONS 
Although the Act may bring about some important changes in the 
predatory lending practices of credit card issuers on college campuses, it 
does not solve some core problems. Reform that does not directly restrict 
student access would likely prove a better solution.191 A combination of 
stronger protections for student data, increased marketing limitations on 
credit card issuers, and student credit education would inform and empower 
students to take responsibility for their own finances while still protecting 
them from the most deceptive and coercive practices. Protecting student 
data would force universities to be more honest and accountable to their 
students.192 Placing further limitations on marketing on campuses would 
decrease the availability of credit cards and therefore force responsible 
students to more actively seek out credit information on their own.193 
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Finally, better credit education would inform and empower students rather 
than suppress their financial freedom.194 
A. STRONGER PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENT DATA 
Student data is already partially protected by the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).195 FERPA was enacted in order to protect 
student privacy and educational records.196 It includes a general prohibition 
against releasing information from a student’s educational record without 
written permission.197 However, there is an exception for student directory 
information198—the exact type of information institutions of higher 
education provide to credit issuers.199 Further, FERPA only applies to 
schools receiving Department of Education funds.200 
The exception for student directory information does, however, include 
the requirement that the school have an opt-out provision.201 Therefore, 
schools may release student directory information but must allow students 
to opt-out of the disclosure. For example, at the University of Michigan 
students are generally told how they can opt-out of having their information 
publicly displayed in directories or provided in response to a request.202 The 
policy is not specific to credit card companies.203 However, opt-out systems 
are problematic because they require an affirmative step by the individual 
student before her information is protected.204 In addition to placing the 
burden on the student, universities may also fail to widely publicize the 
option.205 In order to truly protect student data, this FERPA exception must 
be changed to require an opt-in for disclosure. 
An opt-in privacy policy is one in which students would have to 
expressly give permission before their information may be shared with 
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credit card marketers.206 By requiring this affirmative step, the opt-in policy 
would decrease available member lists.207 In this way, opt-in regimes would 
slow, if not end, direct marketing to college students by limiting the amount 
of information shared with credit issuers.208 
The decision between opt-out and opt-in policies comes down to who 
should internalize the costs of protecting student information—the 
university or the student. Universities may not want opt-in policies because 
they will incur the costs when students opt-out while getting very few 
benefits in return.209 When students fail to opt-in, the university has less 
information to sell and therefore will receive less money in exchange for 
student directories.210 They will also incur costs from disseminating opt-in 
information to students, persuading them to act, and sorting through 
requests received.211 Due to the low benefit and high cost to the universities, 
legislation may be required in order to ensure the use of opt-in policies.212 
Opt-out policies, on the other hand, are better for universities but worse 
for the protection of students. They provide for some student control while 
eliminating the cost of permission seeking.213 The efficiency of the opt-out 
system assumes that the student has full information and can easily and 
readily regain control over her personal information.214 Students often do 
not receive, read, or understand the implications of university policies on 
the use and sharing of their information.215 As a result, students will 
internalize the costs of the information sharing.216 Opt-out policies diminish 
student power and make it substantially more difficult for students to secure 
their personal data.217 As a result, they provide little protection of student 
information. 
A default opt-in policy—or any default rule in which the individual 
retains control over her information even after she provides it freely to one 
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entity—would provide for more protection of student data than an opt-out 
system. Professor Jerry Kang points out that a default rule placing power in 
the student’s hands would eliminate inefficiencies common to the contrary 
approach.218 If the default rule leaves the use of students’ personal 
information to the university’s discretion, a single student would face 
considerable difficulties in determining what information is collected and 
how it is used or distributed.219 With a default rule reserving student control 
over her information, these information costs would be greatly decreased; 
students would know how their information is being used because the 
university would be required to seek their permission to use it.220 This type 
of default rule or opt-in to university disclosure of student directory 
information is necessary to protect students’ data privacy.221 Amending 
FERPA to include such a rule would provide a more comprehensive 
solution to the endless flow of credit offers that bombard college students 
by addressing the problem at its source.222 
B. STRONGER MARKETING LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT CARD ISSUERS 
In order to truly address the problem of predatory solicitations on 
college campuses, the loopholes in § 304 of the Act must be closed.223 
Although these provisions ostensibly provide protections from some of the 
more coercive marketing practices, they may be easily navigated around.224 
Credit issuers will likely only have to change their behavior slightly in 
order to legally continue the same practices.225 
Credit issuers should be prohibited from providing free gifts on 
campus. Under Title III, credit card marketers may technically still be able 
to give out free items to entice students to come over and speak with 
them.226 However, they cannot provide the items as a quid pro quo 
exchange for a filled-out credit card application.227 Students will likely still 
be unduly enticed by the offer of free gifts.228 This is a deceptive practice 
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that the Act should have completely eliminated.229 Title III should have 
required that only information be provided at tables.230 This would provide 
a balance between allowing credit issuers access to students while 
prohibiting any undue influence.231 The information would be there for 
those students who wish to seek it out. This convenience will still likely 
pull in many new customers for the credit issuers, but the new customers 
would not have been enticed by the usual traps.232 
C. CREDIT EDUCATION 
With 39% of students arriving on campus with a credit card233 and 84% 
of the overall student population having credit cards,234 credit education is 
more important than ever. In general, college students may lack the 
financial knowledge and skills necessary to successfully manage their 
credit.235 This ignorance of basic credit management information makes 
credit education an essential element in solving underlying credit misuse by 
undergraduates.236 Financial education can be successful for many 
vulnerable groups, including those new to credit.237 Using guidance from 
students on how to provide the information, universities should be required 
to implement programs that actively educate students on the proper and 
responsible use of credit.238  
More and more freshman students are carrying credit cards. A study 
conducted by Sallie Mae reported a 60% increase—from the Fall of 2004 to 
the Spring of 2008—in the percentage of first-year students carrying credit 
cards.239 At the same time, a large percentage of these students have 
reported being “surprised” by their credit balance.240 Fully 38% have at 
some point expressed surprise at their credit card balance and 22% report 
being frequently surprised.241 Although the feeling of “surprise” may be 
attributed to a number of factors, including failure to account for all 
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purchases or how they will add up,242 it is difficult to imagine that a student 
would be frequently surprised if they completely understood the way credit 
works. In fact, 84% of undergraduates admitted the need for more financial 
management information.243 Credit education could be used to limit the 
likelihood of surprise based on such lack of knowledge. Financial literacy 
can be gained through credit education.244 Credit education provides basic 
information about terms and conditions, how to avoid and manage debt, and 
how interest rates and penalties work.245 Increasing awareness of credit 
issues through education could influence how young consumers view and 
use credit cards.246 At a time when they are being bombarded with credit 
offers, credit education is particularly vital to stemming the flood of poor 
credit decisions.247 
Students appear to agree with this idea. In all, 84% of undergraduate 
students indicated that they would like more education on financial 
management.248 Many students are not receiving this information.249 
Furthermore, 64% indicated that they would like to receive information in 
high school and 40% as college freshman.250 In addition to providing a 
positive response to the idea of credit education, the Sallie Mae study also 
asked students about the best way to provide such information.251 Students 
reported wanting financial management information provided in person, 
preferably “in the classroom” or “through one-on-one meetings.”252 With 
students willing to participate in educational programs and providing the 
roadmap on how best to do it, credit education programs should be 
relatively easy to implement. 
In fact, many credit issuers already provide financial education to 
undergraduate students.253 Likewise, some universities offer financial 
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literacy and credit education.254 The Credit CARD Act could have taken 
credit education a step further by mandating it in universities.255 In the 
alternative, the Act could have required credit education only when the 
university had a contract with a credit issuer.256 Either way, this would go 
further in addressing the underlying dearth of knowledge that can lead to 
credit mismanagement by young consumers.257 As it is, the Act’s limits on 
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds merely delay the potential problem 
instead of providing the fundamental education needed to solve it. 
CONCLUSION 
Title III of the Credit CARD Act is a huge step toward providing better 
protection for young consumers. The aggressive solicitation and marketing 
practices by credit issuers on college campuses made change necessary. 
Although the Act gets it right when it comes to banning the quid pro quo 
exchange of tangible items, prohibiting pre-screened offers, and mandating 
contract disclosures, it leaves open many loopholes and fails to address 
some fundamental problems. Restricting young adult ownership of credit 
cards only delays credit misuse; it does not solve it. The Act should not be 
aimed at discouraging all use, but rather encouraging responsible use. A 
combination of stronger protection of student data, increased marketing 
limitations on credit card issuers, and credit education would create a 
solution where informed and empowered students could take responsibility 
for their own finances and still be protected from the most deceptive and 
coercive practices. 
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